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Will Professor Nimmer's Change of
Heart on File Sharing Matter?
Rick Sanders*
ABSTRACT
In a significant reversal, the leading copyright treatise, Nimmer
on Copyright, has changed its position on the controversial subject of
whether merely making a copyrighted work available for distribution
violates the distribution right-an issue most significant in the context
of peer-to-peer file sharing. Nimmer on Copyright had previously
concluded that the distribution right did not extend so far. It now
embraces whole-heartedly the "making available" theory of copyright
infringement. Courts and practitioners should not follow suit. First,
the treatise relies heavily on legislative materials that predate the
actual passage of the current Copyright Act. Second, it argues that the
current distribution right encompasses the old publication right of the
predecessor Copyright Act, and that the old publication right included
offers for sale. It fails, however, to acknowledge that "publication" had
two very different meanings under the predecessor Act, and it makes
the mistake of conflating those two meanings. In the end, the question
of the "making available" right is intractable and requires
congressional action to set straight.
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Nimmer on Copyright is, without a doubt, the most important
and influential treatise on copyright law.' Originally written by
Melville Nimmer in 1963, it has been revised and maintained by his
son, David, since 1986.2 On controversial subjects-and there are
many in copyright law-their opinion has been known not only to
sway courts but also to make courts see the error of their ways.3 One
such controversial subject, on which David Nimmer apparently
wielded considerable influence, was the impenetrable question of
1. See, e.g., Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 737 (Ct. App. 2002) (Mosk, J.,
concurring); see also Devlin Hartline, Nimmer Changes His Tune: 'Making Available' Is
Distribution, COPYHYPE (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.copyhype.com/2012/10/nimmer-changes-his-
tune-making-available-is-distribution (conducting an informal search on a well-known legal
database and turning up twice as many references for Nimmer than for the second-most-cited
copyright treatise).
2. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, "In
Memoriam" (2012). References to "Nimmer" in this Article are to David Nimmer, except where
indicated.
3. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 514, 520 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Nimmer's criticism of Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983), in reassessing the
holding of that decision).
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whether making an unauthorized copy available for sale or download
constituted a violation of the public-distribution right-one of the
exclusive rights held by copyright owners.4 In those cases, Nimmer
opposed the "making available" theory urged by the copyright owners.5
Nimmer specifically advocated the view that only actual dissemination
of copies violated the distribution right.6
Last year, however, Nimmer did an about-face on the issue. He
now contends that actual dissemination of copies is not a requirement
for infringement of the distribution right and that merely making a
copyrighted computer file available on a publicly accessible network is
sufficient to constitute a violation of that right.' His new view is
based on a careful and fascinating reading of legislative history from
the 1960s and early 1970s of bills that would ultimately be enacted as
the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).8 Nimmer found evidence in
those materials that Congress was adopting an expansive view of the
old publication right, simply renaming it the "distribution" right and
further expanding it.9 Might this be a watershed moment? With
Nimmer's influence, will courts inevitably follow suit?10
As argued below, courts and commentators should not follow
Nimmer blindly into the "making available" theory of copyright
infringement. Not only does Nimmer's change of heart come very late
in the game, well after significant contrary legal authority has
developed (ironically, perhaps, with Nimmer's assistance), but
Nimmer's new analysis contains significant flaws. The most
significant flaw is the assumption that it is appropriate to rely on the
old legislative materials-none of which were even generated by
members of Congress. Nimmer cites no authority for this reliance,
and the available legal authorities on the subject suggest that only
materials generated by the Congress that actually passed the 1976
Act should be considered, if any.11 Additionally, it is far from clear
that Congress was consciously adopting and incorporating an
expansive view of the publication right. The legal authorities Nimmer
cited for this proposition were actually using "publication" in a very
4. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008); Capitol
Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223 (D. Minn. 2008). It is impossible to say
whether, but for Nimmer's influence, the court would have reached a different conclusion.
5. See cases cited supra note 3.
6. See cases cited supra note 3.
7. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Moses Avalon, Copyright Guru Changes Mind: Costs Lawyers Millions,
MOSESAVALON.COM BLOG (Oct. 2012), http://www.mosesavalon.com/copyright-guru-costs-lawyers
-millions; Hartline, supra note 1.
11. See infra Part II.
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different sense, and their pronouncements on the subject are all
arguably dicta.12
I. FILE SHARING AND THE NEED FOR THE "MAKING AVAILABLE" THEORY
OF PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION
File-sharing lawsuits are a bit pass6 these days.13 From 2003
through 2008, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
sued tens of thousands of alleged file sharers and settled before
litigation with an unknown additional number.14 Its goal was to
educate the public by making public examples of ordinary people who
used peer-to-peer file-sharing services to trade copyrighted song
files.15 In 2008, however, after spending tens of millions of dollars in
legal fees,16 the RIAA abandoned the initiative and stopped filing new
12. See infra Part III.
13. Real file-sharing lawsuits, that is. There are a large number of lawsuits involving
the BitTorrent protocol and copyrighted works of pornography, but these do not seem designed to
survive past the pleadings stage. See David Kravets, How Mass BitTorrent Lawsuits Turn
Low-Budget Movies into Big Bucks, WIRED (Mar. 31, 2011, 2:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2011/03fbittorrent (estimating that as of March 2011, about 130,000 persons have
been sued in such lawsuits). As one district court explained:
This course of conduct indicates that the plaintiffs have used the offices of the Court
as an inexpensive means to gain the Doe defendants' personal information and coerce
payment from them. The plaintiffs seemingly have no interest in actually litigating
the cases, but rather simply have used the Court and its subpoena powers to obtain
sufficient information to shake down the John Does.
K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-85, No. 3:11cv469-JAG, 2011 WL 9879174, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011);
see also Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-10, No. 2:12-cv-3623-ODW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89286, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) ("The Court will not idly watch what is essentially an
extortion scheme, for a case that plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial.").
14. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html (noting that the RIAA
had brought approximately 35,000 legal proceedings since 2003); see also John Borland, Record
Industry Warns of New Lawsuits, CNET (Oct. 17, 2003), http://news.cnet.com/Record-industry-
warns-of-new-lawsuits/2100-1027 3-5093078.html.
15. See Press Release, RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File Sharers Who
Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), http://www.riaa.org/newsitem.php?id=
85183A9C-28F4-19CE-BDE6-F48E206CE8Al ("We want to send a strong message that the
illegal distribution of copyrighted works has consequences."); see also McBride & Smith, supra
note 14 (explaining RIAA's decision to "drop its legal assault" after its decision to sue tens of
thousands of individuals "created a public-relations disaster for the industry").
16. According to Ray Beckerman, who represented several defendants in these cases,
the RIAA spent about $16 million in legal fees in 2008 alone, about $21 million in 2007, and
about $19 million in 2006. Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its Lawyers More Than
$16,000,000 in 2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE BLOG
(July 13, 2010, 11:26 AM), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-
ha-riaa-paid-its-lawyers.html. Although Beckerman has a rooting interest on this issue (which is
apparent from the title of his blog post), these figures are based on publicly available Forms 990,
to which Beckerman links in his blog. See id.
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lawsuits.17 This year, the final two such lawsuits-the Thomas-Rasset
case in Minnesota18 and the Tenenbaum case in Massachusetts19-are
in their death throes.
Central to the RIAA's legal strategy was the "making
available" theory of distribution.20 Copyright law does not make
illegal everything that might be done with or to a copyrighted work,
only violations of certain limited (if broadly defined) "exclusive
rights"-most notably, reproducing, adapting, publicly distributing,
publicly performing, or publicly displaying a copyrighted work.21 Not
only must one avoid infringing these rights (unless there is a defense),
one must avoid knowingly assisting or inducing others to infringe
these rights.22
The Copyright Act defines the distribution right as the
"distribut[ion ofi copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending."23 "Copies or phonorecords" are just physical embodiments of
the copyrighted work.24 The distribution right thus covers not only
sales to the public, but also gratuitous distributions and lease-like
transactions.25 The statutory definition left unclear whether merely
offering to sell (or otherwise distribute) a copy constitutes an
infringement of the distribution right in the same way offers for sale
constitute infringements under the Patent Act.2 6 Until the rise of
file-sharing systems, this was a purely academic question because
those who offered to distribute copyrighted goods nearly always
succeeded in doing so, and an offer to distribute would almost
17. See McBride & Smith, supra note 14.
18. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 2011),
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 2013 WL 1091785 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2013) (No.
12-715).
19. Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
20. David Kravets, RIAA 'Making Available' Argument: File Sharers 'Freeload', WIRED
(June 30, 2008, 1:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/06/riaa-making-ava.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006).
22. E.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing contributory copyright infringement).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
24. Id. § 101 (defining "copy" and "phonorecord"). It is generally agreed that an
electronic transfer across a network of a copyrighted computer file constitutes a distribution even
though nothing physical is exchanged and all that typically happens is the recipient's hard drive
is altered. See, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 172-73 (D. Mass.
2008) ("An electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that § 106(3) was
intended to reach.").
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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certainly be enough for an injunction against the actual distribution of
the goods.27
File-sharing systems, especially peer-to-peer filing-sharing
systems, radically changed this calculation because it became much
easier to prove offers to distribute than to prove actual distributions.28
Peer-to-peer file-sharing systems, like many Internet-based
innovations, harness the Internet's "network effect" by inviting users
into a kind of social contract: users obtain access to a wide range of
content, and in exchange, subscribers make their content available to
the system.29 Greatly simplified, peer-to-peer file sharing works by
connecting a subscriber who wants a particular item of content (e.g., a
particular song or movie) with a subscriber who has that content.30
The larger the file-sharing network, the more valuable it is for its
users because the likelihood of finding a desired item of content
increases with the addition of new users to the system.31
For this to work, users must purposely place content into
"public folders" on their computers (i.e., a "walled-off' part of the
computer's directory that any member of the public may access).32 If a
public folder were full of copyrighted song files, that user would be
infringing copyright in two wayS3 3: by (1) helping the downloading
user to make a copy of the file (thus contributorily infringing the
reproduction right) and (2) distributing a copy of the file to the
27. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[C].
28. Id.
29. See Stephanie Watson, How Kazaa Works, HOwSTUFFWORKS.CoM, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/kazaal.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013).
30. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D. Mass. 2008)
(explaining peer-to-peer file sharing); Watson, supra note 29.
31. See Watson, supra note 29.
32. The part of the file-sharing process where one subscriber accesses another's "public
folder" and downloads one or more files is nothing new-it is as old as the Internet. See Watson,
supra note 29. The innovation of peer-to-peer file sharing was the creation of means of
connecting supply and demand. See id. One file-sharing method, most famously employed by
Napster, used a centralized database. See Marshall Brain, How Gnutella Works,
HowStuffWorks.com, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/file-sharing.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2013). This system was vulnerable to the failure or shutdown of the central server that
maintained the database. See id. ("[T]he original Napster's key weakness lay in its
architecture . . . ."). More recent systems that use the FastTrack protocol use a decentralized
system in which subscribers' computers constantly update their content offerings to other
computers on the network. See Watson, supra note 29.
33. At least one district court judge intimated a willingness to accept that file sharing
could be fair use. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D. Mass.
2009) ("A defendant who shared files online during this interregnum, sampling the new
technology and its possibilities, but later shifted to paid outlets once the law became clear and
authorized sources available, would present a strong case for fair use."). Despite an
extraordinary opportunity to make this case, the plaintiff fumbled the argument by failing to
satisfy basic rules of civil procedure. Id. at 221 ("[Plaintiff] did not meet [his] burden; in truth, he
did not come close.").
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downloading user (thus directly infringing the distribution right).34
The RIAA thus had at least two straightforward legal theories of
copyright infringement against a subscriber who was "hosting" the file
in a particular transaction.
These legal theories were not sufficient for the RIAA's
purposes, however. It was very difficult to detect actual downloads of
files from a user's "public" folder, except by having agents initiate the
downloads themselves.35 In a peer-to-peer file-sharing network, it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to directly observe an act of
downloading.36 Even where download logs can be obtained, they are
only circumstantial evidence of what copyrighted work was actually
accessed and downloaded.37 While it is possible to prove an actual
distribution of the files with circumstantial evidence, it requires more
effort and expense because circumstantial evidence usually requires a
jury trial.38 Contributory liability's knowledge requirement would also
be expensive to prove.39  With tens of thousands of lawsuits to
prosecute, even the RIAA lacked the necessary resources.40 The RIAA
needed a legal theory that was easy and cheap to establish and was
sufficiently watertight to force early settlements and adjudications.
The RIAA thus argued that merely making copyrighted files
available on a file-sharing network, without more, constituted
infringement of the distribution right.41 Establishing that files were
available in the targeted subscriber's public folder was simple and
irrefutable.42 All the RIAA had to do was examine the subscriber's
home computer. At that point, a subscriber was doomed: even if the
subscriber destroyed the public folder so completely that forensics
could not reconstruct it, such destruction would almost certainly draw
an adverse inference that the subscriber had made illegal content
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264-65 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214-15 (D. Minn. 2008).
36. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[C][5][b].
37. Id.
38. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 979 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(denying summary judgment to rights holder because defendant admitted to setting up
peer-to-peer file-sharing account containing infringing files but swore he did not place those files
onto the account, thereby creating a question of fact).
39. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265. Unless the defendant admits to having the requisite
knowledge, the plaintiff must prove the defendant's state of mind with circumstantial evidence.
See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
40. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
41. See Kravets, supra note 20.
42. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[C][5][b].
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publicly available.43 Furthermore, this "making available" theory
greatly increased the subscriber's liability because, under the
statutory damages permitted by the Copyright Act, the size of an
award was dependent on the number of works infringed.44 The RJAA
could therefore go from proving infringement of a handful of works to
proving infringement of hundreds or even thousands of works.45 The
challenge for the RIAA was convincing the courts to accept its "making
available" theory of the distribution right-an endeavor that met with
only modest success.46 Courts have generally rejected the theory.47
First, there is no definition of "distribute," which suggests
Congress meant to limit the term to an ordinary and plain meaning.
Furthermore, the distribution right sets forth several examples of
distributions-sales, rentals, leases and lendings-all of which are
consummated acts, .more than mere offers.48
Second, there is a definition of "publication" that incorporates
word for word the distribution right and adds the following sentence:
"[T]he offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of
persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance or
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i); see generally Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v.
Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (analyzing at length the circumstances that
would support an adverse inference).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
45. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that recording companies are entitled to damages of $222,000 and "a broadened
injunction that forbids Thomas-Rasset to make available sound recordings for distribution," but
that "they are not entitled to an opinion on an issue of law that is unnecessary for the remedies
sought or to a freestanding decision on whether Thomas-Rasset violated the law by making
recordings available"), cert. denied, 2013 WL 1091785 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2013) (No. 12-715).
46. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Alburger, No. 07-3705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585,
at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2009) ("[Slources indicate that an individual violates the
exclusive-distribution right by 'making available' that illegally downloaded work to other
internet users." (citing Motown Record Co. v. DePietro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *12-13
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007))); DePietro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *12 (adopting a "making
available" theory); Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185, 190-91
(D. Me. 2006) (adopting a "making available" theory); see also Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v.
Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65765, at *11 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006)
(refusing to reject the "making available" theory at the pleadings stage); Arista Records LLC v.
Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971-72 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (refusing to reject the "making available"
theory at the pleadings stage). Of the three decisions that adopted the "making available" theory,
two (Bigwood and DePietro) were against pro se defendants. See DePietro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11626, at *1; Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 186. The other (Alburger) was something less than a
ringing endorsement of the theory, especially since the theory was not necessary to the holding
(the defendant admitted to reproducing the files), and the court did not use the theory in
calculating damages. See Alburger, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91585, at *11-16.
47. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(collecting cases).
48. See id. at 985; Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216-17 (D.
Minn. 2008).
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public display [constitutes publication.]"49 If the distribution right
included offers to distribute, this additional language would be
superfluous.50
Third, legislative history sheds little light on the issue. The
House Report comments that the distribution right "establishes the
right of publication."5 1 As this Article discusses, this might mean
Congress was equating the distribution right with an older (not
superseded) publication right that might include offers to sell. The
rest of the House Report, however, undercuts this viewpoint by
describing the distribution right in terms of actual, consummated
acts.52
Consistent with the court opinions, the three major copyright
treatises-Nimmer on Copyright, Patry on Copyright, and Goldstein
on Copyright-were unanimous in concluding that there was no
"making available" theory of copyright infringement and that
infringement of the distribution right required an actual,
consummated act of distribution.53
II. NIMMER'S CHANGE OF HEART
The copyright treatises were unanimous until recently. In
early 2012, Nimmer on Copyright reversed itself on this issue and now
confidently asserts that, properly understood, the distribution right
must include offers to distribute.54 The genesis of this about-face55
came in Fall 2011, when Nimmer's long-time collaborator, Professor
Peter S. Menell, published a lengthy article5 6 arguing that, for years,
courts have been misunderstanding the true scope of the distribution
right because they have not looked at all of the legislative history.57
When this veritable "trove" of legislative materials is read in the
proper context, it makes clear that Congress intended to expand an
49. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 803-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
50. See id.
51. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 ("The Committee Reports identified the 'Rights of
Reproduction, Adaptation, and Publication' as '[t]he first three clauses of Section 106."' (citing
Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
52. See id.
53. See Ati. Recording, 554 F. Supp. at 981 (citing 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 8.11[A] (2007); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9 (2007); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1, at 7:125-7:126 (3d ed. 2005)).
54. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[D][4][c].
55. See generally id. § 8.11[D] (examining the division among courts on the scope of the
distribution right and drawing a conclusion about the correct scope).
56. See generally Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright's Lost Ark: Interpreting the
Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 1 (2011).
57. See id. at 5-6.
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old right that Menell argued had always included the right to offer to
sell. 8 Menell's argument persuaded David Nimmer, who invited
Menell to rewrite the section of Nimmer on Copyright dealing with the
distribution right.59 The newly revised section reads more like a law
review article than a treatise. Although Menell penned the revised
section, Nimmer has adopted Menell's positions and arguments on the
matter.
A. Publication's Double-Duty under the 1909 Act
To understand Nimmer's new reasoning, it is instructive to
examine the predecessor to the 1976 Act, the Copyright Act of 1909
(1909 Act). There was no distribution right under the 1909 Act.60
Instead, there was a right to "publish" and a right to "vend."61 At the
time, the term "vend" had a specific and a general meaning.
Specifically, it meant, "to dispose of by sale."6 2 But more generally, it
meant to be in the business of selling.63 The phrase, "I vend dry
goods," expresses both that "I regularly sell dry goods" and "I am in
the business of selling dry goods," which necessarily includes offering
dry goods for sale.6 4 Is a vending machine a "vending" machine
because it regularly sells small snacks or because it offers small
snacks for sale? In ordinary parlance, does it make a difference?
The term "publish" was more subtly ambiguous. It originally
meant to make publicly known-usually (but not always) through
writing-or more specifically "to make generally accessible or
available for acceptance or use; to place before or offer to the public."6 5
But in a more specific business context, it could mean "to issue . .. for
sale to the public (copies of a book, writing, engraving, piece of music,
or the like); said of an author, editor or, spec., of a professional
publisher."66 This latter definition seems to combine creation (of the
copies, not the work) and sending forth ("issue") with a commercial
purpose ("for sale to the public").
58. See id. at 6.
59. See id. at 20 n.90.
60. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075-76 (codified as amended
by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101); Menell, supra note 56, at 37.
61. See Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075; Menell, supra note 56,
at 37.
62. V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 90 [hereinafter OED] (sense 1).
63. Id. (sense 2) (defining the transitive use of "vend" as "To sell; to dispose of by sale; to
trade in as a seller").
64. Id. (sense 2).
65. P OED 1563-4 (senses 1 and 4b).
66. Id. at 1564 (sense 4a).
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Unfortunately, the term "publish" did double-duty under the
1909 Act.67 It not only defined one of the exclusive rights of copyright,
but it was also a requirement for federal copyright protection-or the
destruction of copyright protection. Under the 1909 Act, to copyright a
work, one had to publish the work with statutorily defined "notice."68
Before it was published, state- or common-law copyright governed.69
Common-law copyright was perpetual, but the work remained
unavailable to the public.70 In exchange for making the book publicly
available, the author received a kind of monopoly on the right to
exploit the book limited to twenty-eight or fifty-six years from
publication.7' In this way, Congress hoped to encourage the public
dissemination of knowledge and creativity.72
If an author published a work without notice, the work passed
immediately into the public domain-a harsh result indeed.73 The
1909 Act provided some guidance regarding when to fix the first
"publication" of a work for these purposes. The Act defined "the date
of publication" as, "in the case of a work of which copies are
reproduced for sale or distribution [shall] be held to be the earliest
date when copies of the first authorized edition were placed on sale,
sold, or publicly distributed by the proprietor of the copyright or under
his authority."74
A fairly common defense to a claim of copyright infringement
under the 1909 Act (and before)75 was that the work in question was
67. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.01[D].
68. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1077, 1079; Menell, supra note
56, at 37 (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1078-79).
69. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1076; Societe Civile Guino v.
Renoir, 549 F.3d 1182, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2008).
70. Estate of Martin Luther King v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 4.01[B] (1998)).
71. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1080 (repealed 1976); 1
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.04.
72. The Nimmer treatise states:
Some answer that it is contrary to the public interest for any form of property to
remain entirely private from generation to generation without limit . . . . Others
maintain that society's interest in, and need for free access to, literary property
qualitatively differs from its interest in other forms of private property ....
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.04. Additionally, it points out that, "In any event, even
before the current Act, Congress and the courts, by invoking the doctrine of publication as an act
of divestment, implemented the constitutional policy of limited ownership in literary property."
Id.
73. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1078-79 (repealed 1976);
Societe Civile, 549 F.3d at 1185-86 (citing La Cienega Music Co. v. ZZ Top, 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th
Cir. 1995)); Menell, supra note 56, at 37.
74. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1087-88 (repealed 1976).
75. Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publ'g Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 249-53
(Ct. App. 1898).
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"published" without notice and was therefore not protected under
copyright-or there was some other formal defect related to
publication.76 Litigants sometimes called upon courts to determine
when a work was "published."7 Despite their extreme reluctance, in
essence, to work a forfeiture, courts sometimes held that merely
offering a book for sale constituted a "publication."78  Given the
definition of "date of publication," this seems to be the correct-if
unhappy-result.
With "publish" performing two different functions in the 1909
Act, the possibility arises that "publish" might mean two different
things in the 1909 Act depending on the function.79 On the one hand,
it is neater for a given cohesive act, such as the 1909 Act, to contain
only one meaning for key terms.80 On the other hand, even this
presumption will yield when statutory context demands.81 In the 1909
Act, "publish" fulfills very different functions. Congress might well
have intended to make securing (or accidentally destroying) copyright
easier than violating the publication right. After all, publication with
notice was the only way to secure copyright, but there were multiple
ways to infringe copyright. Arguably, "publication" in the former
sense should be broader than it is in the latter sense, since it has more
work to do.
76. Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 238 F.2d 706, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1956) (per
curiam) (finding forfeit of copyright where actual date of publication was earlier than stated on
the registration).
77. See id.
78. See Menell, supra note 56, at 36-37.
79. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.01[D] (referring to the use of
"publication" in connection with eligibility for federal copyright protection as an "event," and the
other use as an "event," and that these usages were "[e]ntirely separate" and "distinct" from each
other). Subsection 4.01[D] was also apparently coauthored by Menell. See id. n.* ('This
subsection, co-authored by Peter S. Menell, draws heavily on his article, In Search of Copyright's
Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet Age (2010) . . . ."). Nimmer does state
that the right of publication "cannot be understood absent historical development of the concept
of publication," but does not say why. See id. § 4.01[D].
80. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995) (5-4 decision) ("[WMe adopt the
premise that the term should be construed, if possible, to give it a consistent meaning
throughout the Act."); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) ("A term appearing in
several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears." (citing
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 479 (1992))).
81. The Supreme Court explained:
Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. But the presumption is
not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in
which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
employed in different parts of the act with different intent.
Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (citations omitted); see also
Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("But this presumption [that a given term
bears the same meaning throughout a statute] is overcome when Congress indicates otherwise.").
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Courts never attempted to reconcile the meaning of "publish" in
these two contexts. Instead, they further complicated the issue by
treating "publication," as used in the context of securing (or
accidentally destroying) federal copyright, in two very different ways
depending upon external factors. The meaning of "publish" depended
on whether the author was trying to avoid forfeiture of protection, in
which case courts construed the term narrowly, or to secure federal
copyright, in which case courts construed the term broadly.82 Either
way, such courts interpreted the term in the author's favor.83
Additionally, Nimmer on Copyright, among other sources, heavily
criticized this double meaning of "publication" in the same statutory
context.84
Alas, there appears to be no legal authority on the issue that
actually matters here (i.e., whether "publish" as applied to the
exclusive right under the 1909 Act required actual distributions of
copies). There simply appears to be no decision construing "publish"
in that statutory context under the 1909 Act. All of the treatments of
"publish" are instead related to securing (or accidentally destroying)
federal copyright. Certainly, Nimmer does not provide any such
authorities but simply assumes the term means exactly the same
thing in both statutory contexts.85
B. Congress Reforms Copyright Law and the Concept of Publication
In the 1950s, Congress began the long process of reforming
copyright law.8 6 It did not, as Congress often does, reform it piecemeal
with amendments that fixed whatever problems the law had.87 It was
82. See Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz, Liechtenstein v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1982) (tracing the history of these "divestive" and
"investive" meanings of "publication"); Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 645 (D.C.
Cir. 1957) ("[I]t takes more publication to destroy a common-law copyright than to perfect a
statutory copyright.").
83. See supra note 82.
84. See Zachary v. W. Publ'g Co., 143 Cal. Rptr. 34, 41 (Ct. App. 1977); see also Cont'l
Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (referring to the definitions as a
"double standard"). Indeed, this "double standard" was criticized by the concurring judge in the
very decision that appears to have given rise to it. See Am. Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 239 F.2d
740, 745 (2d Cir. 1956) (Medina, J., concurring).
85. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B] [4] [d]. Menell also apparently found no
such authority. See Menell, supra note 56, at 37-38 & n.160.
86. 1 PATRY, supra note 53, at 74-89 (summarizing the history the 1976 Copyright Act).
The impetus for reforming copyright law dates to 1955, after the United States joined the
Universal Copyright Convention and needed to update its laws to conform, but the first formal
report was made by the Register of Copyrights at Congress's instruction in 1961. See id. at
74-76.
87. See id. at 74-89.
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generally agreed that copyright law needed a complete and
fundamental overhaul; a series of amendments would not do.
Copyright law needed to be uprooted and replanted,88 a process that
took several decades.89 During that time, Congress worked closely
with the Register of Copyrights, academics, and representatives of the
various stakeholders.90
Each Congress progressed slightly in drafting a new copyright
act, with one Congress hashing out a series of disputed issues and
leaving the rest to the next Congress, and so forth.91
On the issue of "publication," there was little question that it
had almost no place in the reformed act.92  The publication
requirement's main reason for existence was no longer valid because it
would be inconsistent with international treaties the drafters expected
the United States to join eventually.93  Instead of a
publication-with-notice requirement, which opened the possibility of
unintended forfeiture, copyright would instead arise as soon as the
work was fixed in a tangible medium, such that unintended forfeiture
would be impossible.94
Congress also generally agreed that the "publication" right
should be replaced with something less confusing.95 The rights to
publish and to vend were thus combined into the current right to
distribute.96 "Publication" as a concept was nearly wiped out-but not
so much that it did not merit a definition.97 In 1965, the Register of
Copyrights wrote in the Second Supplementary Report of the Register





92. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.01[B]. Publication continues to have a
number of limited functions in the current copyright act. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 4.01[A] (setting forth fifteen contexts in which publication may be significant).
93. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 144-45 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5760-61. In fact, the United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989. See Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853-61.
94. Id.
95. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][1i]. Actually, Congress was never
explicit about this frustration. Id. Professor Nimmer's only evidence is a statement by Edward
Sargoy, who was involved in the negotiations related to copyright reform in 1965, but who was
representing the American Bar Association at the time. Id. He was not representing any member
of Congress at the time, and he cannot be said to be a spokesman for legislative intent.
Nevertheless, Professor Nimmer's description of this frustration makes intuitive sense. Surely, it
is the best explanation for why Congress abandoned the exclusive right of publication. Whether
the "best explanation" constitutes actual legislative history is more doubtful, however.
96. See id.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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(Second Supplementary Report) that the language of the new
distribution right "is virtually identical with that of the definition of
'publication' . . . , but for the sake of clarity we have restated the
concept here."98 The Register did not elaborate on what she thought
the definition of "publication" was. Thus, in 1965, the congressional
committee in charge of drafting the reformed copyright act had settled
upon the distribution right.99 That draft provision would remain
unchanged when Congress finally passed the 1976 Act.100
Looking at this trove of legislative history and historical
context, Nimmer now concludes that the distribution right includes
offers for sale based on the following syllogism: (1) the distribution
right is synonymous with the old publication right; (2) the old term
"publication" used to include offers for sale; therefore, (3) the new
distribution right must also include offers for sale.101 Nimmer's logic
is flawed because it hand-waves two critical assumptions: (1) that it is
appropriate to look at the legislative history from the 1965 Congress,
or indeed any Congress, in interpreting the distribution right; and (2)
that the right to publish under the 1909 Act actually included the
right to offer to sell.
III. Is NIMMER'S TROVE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY EVIDENCE OF
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT?
David Nimmer appears to assume that it is always appropriate
to look at legislative materials to help interpret statutes, but he cites
no support for this proposition.102 Resorting to legislative materials to
help interpret statutes is, in fact, not always appropriate. To the
contrary, courts may make recourse to legislative history only if the
statutory provision in question is ambiguous based on its plain
meaning and statutory context.103 Furthermore, a court may not use
98. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][4][d] (quoting OFFICE OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SUPPLEMENTARY REGISTER'S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 19 (1965)). For the entire report, see Supplementary Register's Report
on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (1965), 9 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2,
App. 15.
99. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B].
100. Id.
101. Id. § 8.11[D][4][c].
102. Id. § 8.11[B].
103. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) ("Statutory
construction is a 'holistic endeavor.' 'A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . ."' (citations omitted) (quoting United Say.
Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988))); accord
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1997); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) ("[Clourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there.").
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legislative materials to create an ambiguity.104 The ambiguity must
be in the statute itself.105 The mere fact that a statute is controversial
or that an interest group would very much wish the statute were
written differently does not make a statute ambiguous. To be
ambiguous, the statute must permit more than one reasonable
interpretation when read in context.106
A. Is the Distribution Right Ambiguous in Context?
Is the Copyright Act's description of the scope of the
distribution right really so ambiguous as to require recourse to
legislative history? If one were to approach the statutory description
of the distribution right neutrally, there is little reason to even ask
whether offers for sale are included; the right allows an author "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending. . . ."107
The legislative history from the 1960s might indicate that the
distribution right was meant to encompass the publication right,
which might mean it encompasses the right to offer to sell, but that is
irrelevant. One may not use the legislative history to create the
ambiguity; it must be present in the statutory language.108 It is at
least highly questionable whether this statutory language is
ambiguous.
Dictionary definitions hardly create sufficient ambiguity to
require resort to legislative history. One well-known dictionary
defines "distribute" as follows:
1: to divide among several or many: apportion <distribute expenses>
2 a : to spread out so as to cover something: scatter
2 b : to give out or deliver especially to members of a group <distribute newspapers>
<distribute leaflets>
2 c : to place or position so as to be properly apportioned over or throughout an area
<200 pounds distributed on a 6-foot frame>
2 d : to use (a term) so as to convey information about every member of the class named
<the proposition "all men are mortal" distributes "man" but not "mortal">
3 a : to divide or separate especially into kinds
104. See Comm'r v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Wildes,
120 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997)).
105. See Wildes, 120 F.3d at 471.
106. See, e.g., Carrieri v. Jobs.com Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 518-19 (5th Cir. 2004); John v.
United States, 247 F.3d 1032, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
108. See supra notes 80-81.
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3 b : to return the units of (as typeset matter) to storage
4 : to use in or as an operation so as to be mathematically distributive.10 9
Again, approaching these definitions neutrally, which
definition is most appropriate for copyright law? Of the above, surely,
it is 2(b). The examples provided in the definitions even involve
copyrighted material.110 Yet, that definition clearly contemplates a
consummated delivery of something.' Under this definition, if a
pamphleteer offered leaflets without success to several passersby, one
would not say she distributed those leaflets but would say instead that
she failed to do so. One would think her untruthful if she later
reported that she distributed the very leaflets that she still had in her
hands.
Further, it is not as though Congress was unaware of the
possibility of offers to distribute. Indeed, in the definition of
"publication,"112 Congress specifically included "offering to distribute
copies." If "distribution" included "offers to distribute," this additional
sentence would be completely unnecessary. Nimmer dismisses this
additional sentence in the definition of "publication" as an artifact of a
1971 amendment necessary to comply with new treaty obligations-an
artifact that Congress evidently failed to clean up in 1976.113 Any
ambiguity Nimmer thereby seeks to introduce arises not from the
statutory language and statutory context, but from the legislative
history. As discussed above, that sort of ambiguity is irrelevant. 114
109. Distribute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/distribute (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
110. Nimmer also looks at a dictionary to determine whether "distribute" is ambiguous.
His dictionary lacks the final definition given above and includes in its place "to market (a
commodity) under a franchise in a particular area, esp. wholesale." Menell, supra note 56, at 49
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 660 (1961)). He regards this new
final definition as being equally likely as definition 2(b). 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2,
§ 8.11[D][4]. It is submitted that Nimmer is overthinking the problem. No reasonable speaker of
English would prefer "to market (a commodity) under a franchise in a particular area," which
seems a very specific and specialized meaning, over "to give out, deliver," which seems a much
more ordinary use of the word.
111. Menell thinks his version of definition 2(b) is itself ambiguous as to whether it
contemplates an actual delivery of something. The sum of his explanation is as follows: "To
spread out or scatter seems to involve some physical act by the distributor, but could plausibly be
accomplished through placing a work into a file-share folder that is searchable and accessible to
a network of 'subscribers."' Menell, supra note 56, at 50. This reasoning does nothing more than
restate the very proposition he is trying to prove.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
113. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][2][a].
114. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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B. Is It Appropriate to Use Legislative Materials Generated by Previous
Congresses that Debated, but Did Not Enact, Copyright Reform Bills?
Even if one were to resort to legislative history, it still might
not be appropriate to look at the legislative history from 1965 (or even
1971) which is so crucial to Nimmer's argument.115 The purpose of
legislative history is to divine Congress's intentions in enacting a
statute.116 But "Congress" changes every two years.117 One Congress
may have very different intentions and goals than its predecessor,
even if its membership does not change significantly.118 If a bill was
drafted by one Congress, shelved, then passed by a later Congress,
that later Congress's intentions in adopting the old bill's language
may have been very different from the previous Congress's intentions
in drafting it. In short, if one looks at the legislative history at all, we
may look only at the materials generated by the 1976 Congress-the
one that passed the 1976 Act.119
Nimmer cites no authority to support using the intent of
previous Congresses as an aid in statutory interpretation.120 Even
Menell does not cite to any such authority in his article.121 In a
footnote he argues, "Statutory history as well as bill history can also
be important."122 But looking to statutory history-the history of a
statute as it is amended and revised over time-is not the same thing
as looking to the legislative history of previous Congresses to
determine the congressional intent of a later Congress, and none of
Menell's cited authorities suggests otherwise.123
115. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][1].
116. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 618 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
118. To take a hypothetical example, imagine that Congress was contemplating in 1988 a
bill that would criminalize the unauthorized accessing of computer networks because it was
reacting to a series of physical break-ins at buildings hosting central computers. The legislative
material stresses the physical access to the actual computers. The bill is not passed by that
Congress. In 1990, there were no significant changes in Congress, and Congress takes up the
same bill, but in the meantime, there had been a series of remote "hacks" across computer
networks, prominently mentioned in the legislative materials. This time the bill passes. If there
were ambiguity in the act as to whether it applied to remote "hacks," it might be fair to consider
the 1990 materials as evidence that Congress intended to include such "hacks," even though one
might have reached the opposite conclusion if the same bill had passed in 1988.
119. See Lyons v. Ga.-Pac. Corp. Salaried Emps. Ret. Plan, 221 F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting an argument based on earlier legislative history because "we are concerned
with [the statute] as amended by the 1986 legislation, not as it existed before").
120. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2.
121. See Menell, supra note 56, 52-53 nn.222-26 (failing to cite legislative intent of prior
Congresses).
122. See id. at 52 n.225.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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Menell might have usefully cited to Mizrahi v. Gonzales,12 4 in
which the Second Circuit did look far back in time to examine older
legislative materials for an old statute that had been amended on
numerous occasions.125 But even in Mizrahi, the court limited its
examination of the older legislative materials to those materials
generated by the Congresses that actually enacted amendments
relevant to the court's inquiry.126 By contrast, the materials Nimmer
relies on were generated by Congresses that did not, in fact, enact the
1976 Act.127
Further, the legislative materials on which Nimmer relies did
not necessarily reflect the views of Congress. They represent the
views of (1) the Register of Copyright, (2) the General Counsel of the
Copyright Office, and (3) the American Bar Association.128 Those
entities are highly influential; it is a safe assumption that their words
carried a great deal of weight with Congress. Those groups and
individuals were present because of their great expertise and the fact
that the Copyright Office, and the General Counsel in particular,
played a central role in drafting the text of what would become the
1976 Act.129 But they were not, in fact, members of Congress. And it
is Congress's intent that matters.130 At best, Nimmer's legislative
materials constitute indirect evidence of legislative intent.
The 1976 Act arguably should be treated differently because its
legislative history is so unusual. The debate, analysis, and thinking
that went into the 1976 Act spanned more than a decade.131 The 1976
Act was enormously complex and intended to satisfy several interest
groups.132 It is perhaps expecting too much of the 1976 Congress to
distill all of this into a single set of legislative materials. Where the
enactors were silent, perhaps it is appropriate to look at what the
drafters were thinking, even if those thoughts were already more than
ten years old. In the right hands, this argument might be compelling,
but it is not an argument that either Nimmer or Menell makes.
124. 492 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2007).
125. See id. at 167-73.
126. See id.
127. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B] [1].
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 618 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
131. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B].
132. See id.
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IV. DID CONGRESS ADOPT AND INCORPORATE AN EXPANDED VIEW OF
THE OLD PUBLICATION RIGHT INTO THE NEW DISTRIBUTION RIGHT?
The other flaw in Nimmer's syllogism is the assumption that
the publication right (as opposed to the publication requirement)
encompassed the right to offer to sell under the 1909 Act. Nimmer
confidently asserts that by the 1950s the "right to 'publish' was
understood to encompass the offering of copyrighted work to the
public," and that "[m]id-twentieth century cases were in accord, as
were later characterizations of prior law." 13 3 Nimmer cites a number
of legal authorities for these assertions;134 unfortunately, none of them
is actually about the exclusive right to publish.135 They each deal with
the 1909 Act's other use of "publish"-the means by which a work is
copyrighted (if published with notice) or falls immediately into the
public domain (if published without notice).136
A. Does "Publish" Mean the Same Thing Throughout he 1909 Act?
As recounted above, the term "publish" did double duty under
the 1909 Act: it defined both an essential requirement for copyright
and one of its exclusive rights.137 As argued above, in light of the very
different purposes for which the 1909 Act used "publish," the term
probably meant different things in the two different contexts. In one
context, its purpose was to force authors out of the perpetual but
private monopoly afforded by common-law copyright and into the
limited but public (and hopefully more lucrative) monopoly afforded by
federal copyright law.138 In the other context, its purpose was to set
the boundaries of that monopoly.139
There is also the language of the 1909 Act itself. The provision
that governs initiation of copyright by publishing with notice, § 9,
implies that offers for sale are not "publications." It has two
133. Id. § 8.11[B][4][d] (footnotes omitted).
134. See id. § 8.11[B][4][d] nn.86-92.
135. See id. (citing, in order, Jeweler's Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publ'g Co.,
155 N.Y. 241, 254 (Ct. App. 1898); William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95
F. Supp. 264, 267 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc., 238 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1956); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1980); Roy Export
Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1102 n.14 (2d Cir. 1982);
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1906); Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93
F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1937); 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909) (repealed 1976)).
136. See id.
137. See supra Part II.A.
138. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 4.04. This section was not coauthored by
Menell. See id.
139. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.01. This section was not coauthored by
Menell. See id.
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requirements. First, the author must publish with notice.140 Second,
each "such notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or
offered for sale . . . ."141 If "publications" included offers for sale, there
would be no need to include "or offered for sale" here.
This is not to say with any confidence that "publish" does not or
cannot mean the same thing in both of these contexts, nor does it
mean that Congress did not or could not have assumed "publish"
encompasses the right to offer to sell. It is only to say that these are
unexamined assumptions. More importantly, they are assumptions
about which reasonable minds can differ, and thus they are
insufficient to sustain the certainty with which Nimmer in his treatise
presents his conclusions.
B. Is the Use of "Publish" in the 1909 Act Truly Expansive?
In addition, Nimmer's authorities are not as on point as he
thinks. True, they are consistent in stating that placing a work on
sale or making it generally available to the public constitutes a
"publication."142  In none of those cases, however, is this broad
pronouncement necessary to the holding. In Jewelers' Mercantile, the
book in question was physically lent to subscribers.143 William A.
Meier Glass is probably better analyzed as a trade-secret case.144 In
Advisers v. Wiesen-Hart, the items of jewelry were considered
published when they were physically delivered to retailers (as opposed
to when they were physically delivered to customers), but that was in
140. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1078 (repealed 1976).
141. Id.
142. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][1].
143. 155 N.Y. 241, 254 (Ct. App. 1898). Thus, the court's rule that a book is published if
it was "put within reach of the general public" was unnecessarily broad and could be considered
dicta. Id. The court seemed to be at a loss how to analyze a lending of a book, and, instead of
focusing on the physical dissemination of the book, it tried to shoehorn the transaction in terms
of sale. See id. at 250-52.
144. 95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951). In William A. Meier, the plaintiff was attempting
to enforce a "loop design" in its glassware under "a common property right" (which is never
referred to as "common-law copyright"). Id. at 266. The plaintiff had not attempted to secure
either copyright or a design patent in the "loop design." Id. at 267. It showed the glassware in
question to defendant under an agreement of secrecy, but it then later displayed and offered for
sale the glassware at a public trade show. Id. at 268. The opinion was silent as to whether any
sales actually occurred, the court apparently believing the issue irrelevant. See id. Once the
glassware was publicly displayed and offered for sale, the defendant was free to copy the "loop
design." Id. Although the court described the plaintiffs right as "an exclusive property right
[under common law] in designs for works of ornament or utility until publication," it then
analyzed the issue under trade-secret principles: "In the absence of a statutory copyright or
patent, no person has the monopoly in any idea, device or process, which has not been effectively
kept a secret." Id. at 267-68 (emphasis added). Obviously, placing an item up for sale is not
consistent with keeping it a secret.
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the context of determining the date of publication from which the
copyright term commences, not for determining whether a general
publication had taken place.145 In Data Cash Systems, the plaintiff
had actually sold twenty-five hundred units of the electronic game
that contained the copyrighted material.146 When the plaintiff argued
that there was no evidence that any of those customers actually
played the game, the court dismissed this argument as "a proposition
akin to the epistemological query after whether a falling tree makes a
sound when there is no one to hear it."147 The footnote of Roy Export,
to which Nimmer cites, is unnecessary dicta.148
C. Is Greenbie v. Noble Truly an Outlier?
Only one legal authority discusses the exclusive right of
publication under the 1909 Act. That legal authority, Greenbie v.
Noble,149 is contrary to Nimmer's thesis, and, while Nimmer offers no
other cases to contradict Greenbie, he does all he can to devalue it.150
In Greenbie, the plaintiff, a writer, sued a book publisher and a
book club for "publishing" a book that infringed the copyright in her
book.151 Although the defendants admitted to publishing and vending
the books (but not to infringing the plaintiffs copyright), it became
necessary for the court to establish precisely when and where the book
club "published" and "vended" the book.152 The court rejected on two
grounds an argument that the book club had "vended" the book in
each state where it offered its book for sale: (1) that mere offers for
sale, without more, did not constitute "vending" (or, presumably,
145. 238 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1956). At least one court believed that the date of
publication was a separate concept from whether a general publication occurred. See Patterson v.
Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 1937). Confusingly, Nimmer cites to this case as
though it held the opposite. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11 n.91.
146. 628 F.2d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 1980).
147. Id.
148. 672 F.2d 1095, 1102 n.14 (2d Cir. 1982). The question in Roy Export was whether a
single, restricted broadcast of a compilation of clips from different motion pictures constituted a
publication that divested the compilation of its common-law copyright. Id. at 1100-04.
149. 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
150. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11 n.86.
151. Greenbie, 151 F. Supp. at 49.
152. See id. at 49, 62-63. The defendants had asserted the statute of limitations as a
defense. Id. Under the 1909 Act (and contrary to current law), the statute of limitations was
determined by the law of the state in which the action was brought, which was New York. Id. at
62. Unfortunately, as to the out-of-state book club, New York state law directed the court to use
the statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action arose. Id. at 63. To the court,
this meant determining where the book club violated any of the plaintiffs exclusive rights. See
id. Since the two relevant exclusive rights were the rights to publish and to vend, the court
focused its attention on determining where the book club caused the publication and vending of
the allegedly infringing books. See id. at 63-64.
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publication); and (2) the offers, in any event, "emanated from" and
"consummated in" the book club's home state.153 As authority for the
former, the court cited an 1834 English patent opinion-a peculiar
choice.154
Nimmer calls Greenbie an outlier,155 but it is the only opinion
directly on point because it is the only one to address the scope of the
publication and vending rights.156 Nimmer criticizes the court for
relying on such peculiar authority.157 Admittedly, Greenbie is only one
opinion-a trial-level one at that-and its reasoning is open to
question.158 But it is just as true that, the one time a court addressed
whether offers to sell infringed copyright under the 1909 Act, that
court answered in the negative.159 That is one more legal authority
than Nimmer has to support his assumption that the publication and
vending rights include offers to sell.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article does not criticize Nimmer's view because it is
wrong. He is not obviously or necessarily wrong, but he is not
obviously or necessarily right either, and this is problematic. If his
opinion were expressed in a law review article, that would be
appropriate. Indeed, Menell's article, on which the revised section
8.11 is based, was a stimulating shot across the bow of those who had
grown comfortable with the notion that the difficult proof of actual
distribution was necessary to bring file sharing to heel. But Nimmer
on Copyright is a treatise. Practitioners spend considerable sums of
money160 on treatises not to be treated to law review-like normative
arguments, but rather to be told, with confidence, what the law is. As
Melville Nimmer, the original author of Nimmer on Copyright, said in
explaining what "impelled" him to draft the treatise in the first place:
It is not just that I believed there to be a need for a study in both depth and breadth of
the manifold problems which confront lawyers and judges in copyright matters. More
than that, the inordinate number of "open questions" which pervade the law of copyright
153. Id. at 63-64.
154. Id. at 64 (citing Minter v. Williams, 111 Eng. Rep. 781 (K.B. 1835)).
155. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11 n.86.
156. See supra notes 121, 123-24.
157. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11 n.86.
158. Id.
159. Greenbie, 151 F. Supp. at 63-64.
160. The Author's firm pays about $200 a month for the privilege of having electronic
access to Nimmer on Copyright. That is a tidy sum of money. The Author's criticism
notwithstanding, it is still money very well spent.
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offer both a challenge and a charm to this area of the law which is almost, if not
entirely, unique.16 1
The revised section 8.11 of Nimmer on Copyright no longer says
what the law is. If it did, it would present Menell's revelations as
merely one piece of a difficult puzzle. It would acknowledge the
considerable body of case law that had already developed on the
subject, rather than brushing them aside as sub-"optimal."16 2 It would
not pretend that there are no other reasonable points of view.
Instead, it describes a clearly unsettled area of the law as settled. In
its rush to settle what is unsettled, section 8.11 overleaps at least two
crucial issues.163 It would be of much more value to a judge or
practitioner, when confronted with the thorny question of the scope of
the distribution right, to learn the hard truth that the law is indeed
unsettled, and to learn what the competing views are.164 Where the
author of the treatise has developed an opinion on an open question of
law based on many years of wrestling with the problem, the author
should by no means hide that opinion. Rather, he should state the
opinion persuasively, but clearly marked as such.165
It may be that the revision to section 8.11 will become a kind of
self-fulfilling authority. In the past, Nimmer on Copyright has been
instrumental in correcting courts' misconceptions about points of
copyright law.166 Based on this reputation, it may be so authoritative
that courts will not question its conclusions. It will be incumbent on
practitioners faced with an uncritical presentation of section 8.11 to
persuade a court to look behind the treatise to see that its foundations
are not as solid as they appear. Courts are often perfectly willing to
ignore Nimmer where his conclusions are not supported by the
161. Preface to the Original Edition of 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, (1963) (emphasis added).
162. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[C].
163. There are potentially others. For example, although the Second Supplementary
Report is clear about the desire to combine the old rights to publish and to vend, Nimmer
provides no evidence that any member of Congress agreed with the Register on this point or was
even aware of the issue in 1965. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[B][2][c]. Experts
and special interests may help draft bills, but it is Congress's intent that matters.
164. A good example is 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 24:67-134 (4th ed. 2012), where McCarthy takes up the difficult and
unsettled subject of trademark dilution, which had been made even more difficult and unsettled
by a recent revision of the controlling statute. McCarthy gives all legal authority and
commentators their due in a neutral way before explaining his own opinion in sections
conspicuously labeled "Author's Comment." E.g., id. §§ 24:67-68. Of course, Nimmer himself
often does this. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 9.05[E].
165. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.11[C].
166. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 514, 520 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Nimmer's criticism of Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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controlling legal authority.167 Hopefully this is an isolated incident
that will be corrected by revising section 8.11 of Nimmer on Copyright
to state what the law is. If this proves to be a trend, practitioners
(and judges) will have to turn away from Nimmer on Copyright, and
all would be poorer for it.
This is not a matter of taking sides. To the contrary, the scope
of the distribution right in the Internet age is impenetrable and cries
for congressional action, for neither "solution" to the problem is
entirely satisfactory. One solution provides cover for what is clearly
illegal activity, but the other solution ratchets up liability to
unconscionable levels. One reasonable starting point might be for
Congress to create a separate exclusive right to make the copyrighted
work available for digital download,168 but then to subject
infringements of that right to significantly milder damages.169 It
stands to reason that merely offering a work for distribution is not
nearly as damaging to the copyright owner as actually distributing it,
but neither is it harmless. Therefore, under this approach, those who
have merely made copyrighted digital content available to a network
should be punished much less, but enough to deter such conduct in the
future.
167. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 777-78 (6th Cir.
2005) (rejecting Nimmer's conclusions because it was based on a faulty legal premise); Aurora
World, Inc. v. TY Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1131 n.38 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Although potentially
authoritative in other jurisdictions, Nimmer does not appear to state the law of this circuit.");
Specific Software Solutions, LLC v. Inst. of Workcomp Advisors, LLC, 615 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715
(M.D. Tenn. 2009) (rejecting Nimmer's view on a controversial subject); Order to Show Cause Re:
Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 3, Kandy Kiss of Cal., Inc. v. Tex-Ellent, Inc., No. CV-10-9215
GAF (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011), ECF 17 (rejecting Nimmer in favor of out-of-circuit authority),
vacated on other grounds, Order Vacating Order to Show Cause Re: Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
Kandy Kiss of Cal., Inc. v. Tex-Ellent, Inc., No. CV-10-9215 GAF (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011), ECF
26.
168. This concept is hinted at elsewhere in the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
169. Arguably, the entire copyright damages regime requires recalibration in light of
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., which gave juries the exclusive power to set
statutory damage awards. See 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
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